On the occasion of the 20th anniversary of September 11, dis:orient spoke with Masood Raja, U.S.-Pakistani professor of postcolonial studies, about the (new) War on Terror, the Taliban and the future of Afghanistan.
Prof. Raja, today is the 20th anniversary of 09/11, which was one of the most consequential events in modern history. What remains for you after 20 years of War on Terror in Afghanistan?
I was in the U.S. on that day. It was probably the most terrible day in American history after the 2nd World War. To me, it was a sad day in two ways: More than 3,000 people were killed and if you look like me and walked through the streets of America on that day, you felt like you were incriminated for what happened. But what I also experienced, which does not come through in the media, especially in the Islamic part of the world, is that I had sixty messages on my answering machine from my American friends who were asking if I was okay. They were worried about me walking on the streets late at night in a conservative state. That was impressive to me. This is a part of the story we do not tell. We know about hateful incidents in the U.S. but this taught me something about my friends and the everyday America away from big politics.
On the other side of the world though, it was the Afghans who carried the consequence of 09/11. President Bush had to show that he was doing something, so he invaded Afghanistan. The consequence was another 20 years of war.
Despite the violence and corruption in the country, however, we have also seen another development: Civic structures were rebuilt and newly formed during these 20 years of Western investment. There are women in Kabul and Herat these days, protesting against the Taliban. The reason is, regardless how imperfect it was, that women were able to join the public sphere again, to get education and jobs. They could reconnect with Afghanistan’s own past – thinking back to the early 60s when Kabul used to be a progressive and modern city. It is a great tragedy that we might lose this re-emerged civil society. This is the loss of Afghan people.
How is the atmosphere in the U.S. after 20 years of war and the withdrawal of the troops?
There was no pressure on President Biden to pull out the troops by a certain deadline. Neither the Republicans nor the popular masses were pushing. It was not like Vietnam, there was no popular and political imperative to do that. This decision was made by the previous administration but it could have been done in a better way – for example, including peace keeping forces and a treaty with the Taliban. But they left and now blame the Afghan people for not defending themselves, ignoring the government and the military leadership were corrupt. What I also see is a kind of sadness among the American people about the situation in Afghanistan.
The War on Terror, however, does not seem to be out of the picture, but is now forging new alliances. In late 2019 and early 2020, we saw two major offensives against the Afghan offshoot of the so-called Islamic State in which Taliban, government forces, and U.S. troops cooperated. Is this the future of the remnants of the War on Terror?
The United States’ actions in the world are always connected to their national interests. Following official statements, it seems that they will concede some legitimacy to the Taliban to contain this new IS affiliate in the region. This still sells the Afghan people down the drain. The problem of U.S. foreign policy is that if they are in pursuit of controlling an enemy, they are often enabling another brutal regime. When they think it serves their national interests, they have no qualms about working with brutal dictators. After 20 years of war, it would be a shame if the United States recognizes the Taliban.
Reporting on the dramatic situation of Afghan civilians after the Taliban’s takeover has quickly given way to a realpolitik rationalization, hoping that the Taliban may have changed. Government leaders of various countries are now advocating negotiations with and even aid payments to the Taliban. What does the international acceptance of the Taliban mean with regard to the last 20 years?
The question is: What are Western and regional powers like the USA, Pakistan, and Turkey accepting by recognizing the Taliban? They are accepting the fact that an armed group can conquer a country, disrupt its government and constitution which was in power and proclaim themselves as the country’s legitimate government. None of the Western nations would ever concede that an invading army can come and conquer them and simply say, “Let’s go and negotiate with them.”
Additionally, the assumption that the Taliban have changed lacks any evidence. I’m a liberal scholar and believe that people can change. But, at the end of the day, we have to think about to what extent the Taliban can change at all. Every time when the Taliban move towards the center, their own followers leave them for a more radical branch of terrorists. They have to retain whatever legitimacy they have with their foot soldiers. I do not think that the Taliban will change and set up a democratic system. This is against their basic indoctrination. To assume that the Taliban will change is wishful thinking. I would dare international leaders to go to Kabul and Herat and ask the women on the ground for their opinion.
What motivates this wishful thinking, why would political leaders accept the Taliban?
The U.S. does not practically care if Afghanistan becomes a democratic state or not. What they want is a stable Afghanistan where no one launches a group of Jihadists who strike against the United States. This is the U.S. interest.
This leads back to what we said about the new coalition against the Afghan offshoots of IS. A new narrative has already been developed by the USA. In Afghanistan, there is a terrible organization called ISKP (Islamic state in the Khorasan Province), they bombed the airport, the Taliban do not like them either. The U.S.’ logic is to work through the Taliban to oust the Islamic State. This is not about Afghan people. It is about having a stable Afghanistan which does not threaten them.
When we look at regional powers like Turkey, the case is different. Negotiating with the Taliban gives President Erdoğan leverage. He can sell the international community an access to the Taliban and gain some political prestige.
Does this also apply for Pakistan?
Pakistan has primarily a different, geopolitical interest. The Pakistani rationalization for the support of the Taliban is closely connected to India who invested around three billion dollars in the last 20 years in Afghanistan. They build hospitals and schools. But according to Pakistan, India has also used Afghanistan to support certain terrorist groups who fight against Pakistan. Thus, from Pakistan’s strategic point of view, ousting the Afghan government meant to deny India’s access to the country. Since India can no longer use Afghanistan for their own benefit, the current situation is a huge success for Pakistan.
Pakistan's role in the Taliban's existence and success has been an open secret since its inception. Last week, photos of ISI (Pakistan’s secret service) chief Faiz Hamed's visit to Kabul circulated on social media. Ex-Pentagon official Michael Rubin called the visit a proof that the Taliban are “merely an ISI puppet” and a creation of Pakistan. What do you think?
The first question that comes up is: Why is it the chief of Pakistan’s secret service visiting Afghanistan and not the foreign minister or any other elected official? The answer is: Pakistan announces to the world that they have access to the Taliban and that it will be mediated through them. This gives Pakistan an international standing. Regional powers flirt with their mediating power and access to the Afghan regime. None of this, however, meets the needs of the Afghan people.
What I want Pakistan to look at is the long-term consequence of this involvement. It is hard to find an Afghan in diaspora who has something good to say about Pakistan. Even though Pakistan hosted millions of Afghan refugees. More and more Afghans have the impression that Pakistan is interfering too much in Afghan affairs. And Pakistan justifies this from the point of view of their national interests. Now as the Taliban have come to power, the Afghan people will see Pakistan as the enabler of its oppression and the spreading brutality. It is sad to see this wall of hate in the region.
Coming back to the American strategy: Since the U.S. left Afghanistan without an appropriate transition and has failed its responsibility towards the people, what could be done now for civic society?
Part of the American responsibility was to make sure that the people they supported and brought to power would be accountable to their own people. Instead, they run away from their country with millions of dollars.
I think the responsibility now has to be directed to a new Afghanistan that has emerged in the last 20 years. The question is whose side will the United States be on: Will they enable Afghan people to have some freedom and use as much diplomatic pressure as they can; or will they just acknowledge the Taliban as legitimate leaders and work through them to safeguard their own interests. I would rather wish that the United States uses its economic might to make sure that the Taliban cannot normalize their presence, that civic structures can be strengthened and that there is a more inclusive transitional government.
The new Afghani civil society you are speaking of is often denied by international media: It is claimed that Afghanistan has no civil society and is only an arena for external state interests.
Such narratives are essentializing Afghanistan as an anti-democratic place without national and regional sense of identity. Compared to India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, Afghans have had a longer history of being a nation. It has always been a multiethnic nation. Almost every ethnic group in Afghanistan traditionally has tribal councils. The system of jirga (traditional assembly of local leaders) comes from Afghanistan. If you have land or war disputes, elders of the involved parties come together and talk. It might be male-dominated but it is a historically proven civic system of conflict resolution. Since Afghanistan today is politically weak and economically deprived, people think they can intrude in it. However, there is nothing inherent that would make it impossible for this country to become a modern democracy.
The supposed question of whether democracy is possible in Afghanistan is predominantly debated now as parts of the government have fled and the military forces surrendered without a fight. It is even said that Afghans did not want democracy. Vienna-based professor Ebrahim Afsah, for example, judged that Afghans would have no fundamentally different worldview than the Taliban and no (democratic) community of interest with their Western "helpers".
This is again a deeply essentializing view which is flattening out the complexity of the conflicts as well as religious and ethnic affiliations in Afghanistan. For example, not everyone in Afghanistan is a Sunni Muslim. And not everyone among the Sunnis joins their militant ideas. When the Taliban enters Herat, for example, they do not only enter a territory which follows a different sect of Islam but in their eyes, it is a territory of unbelievers and enemies.
Those who assume that Afghans base their worldview only on religious aspects ignore the fact that Afghanistan exists in the modern age. It means to assume that Afghans live somewhere in the 16th century of Europe. Such statements dehumanize the people of Afghanistan, basically stating that they had no capacity to be modern.
What is even more problematic is the conclusions of such talk about Afghans: One conclusion might be that that we don’t need to invest in Afghanistan because no matter what we do nothing will change. At the same time, such framing of backwardness is the bases for the Western urge to “help”. Originally, the term “to help” presupposes that it has to be altruistic, regardless of the expectations of the other. In the case of Afghanistan though, I would blame the “helpers” for not understanding the complexity of Afghan reality and instead blaming the Afghan people for the current disaster.
This is a country that has seen war since 1979. If some of them are still fighting for their own rights and the rights of the others, this tells you the great strength of these people. Despite 40 years of war, they can still find time to be kind and generous to each other. We grew up with Afghan refugees in our cities in Pakistan. One thing that you will never see an Afghan do: They will never stretch their hand to you and ask for money. They will ask for work.
The Afghan people seem to be caught between the power-political ambitions of regional actors on the one hand and the human rights commitment and the War on Terror of Western states on the other. Will Afghan society ever be able to decide for itself?
Afghanistan is and will be a multiethnic state. The people will have their regional identities but what has come true in the last 20 years is a recognition of this multiethnicity. The people protesting in Kabul, Herat and Jalalabad were not carrying a Qur’an or the Pashtun flag, for example. They were carrying the secular Afghan flag. This is a sign of a nucleus of young people who believe in the flag of Afghanistan and not in the flag of one political party or region. This is an important signal of young people and people living in the urban centers who developed this viable, civic imagination of Afghanistan. I believe that this sentiment will grow stronger in the future.
